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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Jesse Elias appeals from the judgment entered on his conviction for forcible 
sexual penetration, arguing that Idaho Code § 18-6608 does not criminalize 
nonconsensual sexual penetration that occurs while the victim is sleeping. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
At 3:30 a.m. on July 20, 2010, Elias forced entry into the home of S.L.S., a 
woman he had met less than three weeks earlier. (Tr.,1 p.40, L.1 - p.41, L.5; p.45, L.24 
- p.46, L.2; p.151, Ls.6-16.) He snuck up the stairs to S.L.S.'s bedroom, where she lay 
sleeping with her two young children, and proceeded to digitally penetrate her vagina. 
(Tr., p.39, Ls.21-25; p.40, Ls.23-24; p.41, Ls.14-22; p.43, Ls.7-12.) S.L.S. awoke and, 
while trying to prevent Elias's further attempts to penetrate her vagina, she recognized 
her assailant and demanded that he leave immediately. (Tr., p.42, L.9 - p.45, L.2.) 
Elias left and S.L.S. called the police. (Tr., p.42, Ls.3-11.) The police subsequently 
located and arrested Elias. (R, pp.8-10.) 
The state charged Elias both with forcible sexual penetration and with burglary. 
(R, pp.42-43.) Elias pled not guilty to both charges (R, pp.30-32) and went to trial (R, 
pp.59-64; see also Tr.). At the trial's conclusion, the jury returned guilty verdicts on both 
counts. (R., p.91.) 
The district court entered judgment against Elias and imposed concurrent unified 
sentences of fifty years with ten years fixed on the forcible sexual penetration 
1 There are multiple volumes of transcripts on appeal. All citations to "Tr." herein are to 
the Supplemental Transcript on Appeal. 
1 
conviction, and ten years fixed on the burglary conviction, but retained jurisdiction. (R., 
pp.101-04.) After the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court placed Elias on 
probation for 14 years. (R., pp.113-17.) Elias filed a notice of appeal timely from the 
district court's retained jurisdiction disposition order. (R., pp.121-24.) 
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ISSUE 
Elias states the issue on appeal as: 
Should this Court vacate Mr. Elias' conviction for unlawful 
penetration by a foreign object because there was insufficient evidence to 
support the conviction? 
(Appellant's brief, pA.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Elias failed to show that the jury was presented with insufficient evidence to 
support his conviction for forcible sexual penetration? 
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ARGUMENT 
Substantial Competent Evidence Was Presented At Trial From Which The Jury Found 
Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That Elias Was Guilty Of Forcible Sexual Penetration 
A. Introduction 
Elias does not dispute the underlying facts of this case: In the dead of night, 
Elias broke into S.L.S.'s home, snuck up the stairs to her bedroom where she Jay 
sleeping with her two young children, and proceeded to digitally penetrate her vagina. 
(See Appellant's brief, pp.1-2, 11-14.) Elias contends that that evidence is insufficient to 
sustain his conviction, arguing that his "actions are not prohibited by the statute under 
which he was prosecuted because the penetration occurred while the victim slept .... " 
(ld., pp.1, 6-14.) Elias's argument fails. His forcible sexual penetration of S.L.S. falls 
squarely within the conduct prohibited by Idaho Code § 18-6608. His conviction should 
therefore be affirmed. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law over 
which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140 Idaho 796, 
798,102 P.3d 1115,1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404,405,94 P.3d 709, 710 
(Ct. App. 2004). 
C. The State Presented Substantial Evidence At Trial From Which The Jury Could 
Conclude That Elias Was Guilty Of Forcible Sexual Penetration 
Idaho Code § 18-6608, which criminalizes forcible sexual penetration, states in 
pertinent part: 
4 
Every person who, for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification or 
abuse, causes the penetration, however slight, of the genital or anal 
opening of another person, by any object, instrument or device, against 
the victim's will by use of force or violence ... shall be guilty of a felony 
and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more 
than life. 
I.C. § 18-6608. Thus, to convict Elias of forcible sexual penetration, in addition to 
showing the required mens rea, the state also needed to present sufficient evidence for 
the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Elias penetrated, however 
slightly, S.L.S.'s vagina; (2) the penetration was against S.L.S.'s will; and (3) the 
penetration was accomplished by use of force. (See R., p.79.) The state proved each 
element beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Elias concedes the element of actual penetration. (Appellant's brief, p.1.) 
Elias has never argued that the penetration was consensual. S.L.S. testified 
that, before going to sleep, she locked her windows and door, and placed a board in the 
back door to secure it. (Tr., p.40, Ls.1-19.) Elias therefore had to force entry into 
S.L.S.'s house, which both S.L.S. and the investigating officer testified appeared to 
have occurred. (Tr., p.51, L.20 - p.52, L.10; p.74, Ls.2-10.) Elias himself testified that 
he entered S.L.S's home without her permission. (Tr., p.163, Ls.1-7.) Though Elias 
was acquainted with S.L.S., he did not have her permission to come over whenever he 
wanted, they had never dated, and they had never engaged in any consensual physical 
relationship. (Tr., p.38, L.24 - p.39, L.9.) S.L.S. also testified that Elias's sexual assault 
woke her from her sleep (Tr., p.40, Ls.20-24); thus, being asleep when Elias penetrated 
her, she certainly did not consent to the penetration. In addition, an expert witness 
explained that, based on the abrasions S.L.S. received on her inner labia due to the 
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assault, her legs would have been closed when Elias penetrated her. (Tr., p.104, LS.2-
23.) Finally, S.L.S.'s immediate reaction to the assault, the fear in her voice on the 
phone while reporting the assault to the police (see Tr., p.195, LS.2-14 (prosecutor 
describing the recording of the 911 call, entered into evidence as State's Exhibit 2)2) 
and her state of shock while relating her experience to the investigating officer (Tr., 
p.72, Ls.13-18), support the reasonable inference that the penetration was against 
S.L.S's will. Therefore, the state presented sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude 
that the penetration was against S.L.S.'s will. 
The only question before this Court is whether the penetration was accomplished 
"by use of force." I.C. § 18-6608. Force is defined as "[plower, violence, or pressure 
directed against a person or thing." Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd Pocket Ed. (2006). The 
quantum of force required by the forcible sexual penetration statute is undefined by the 
statute and presents an issue of first impression in Idaho. Recently, in State v. Jones, 
Docket No. 36841, 2011 Opinion No. 57 (September 12, 2011 )3, the Court of Appeals 
discussed the two predominate approaches to defining "the amount of physical coercion 
sufficient to demonstrate that sexual activity was accomplished 'by force. '" See & at 
11-17. Those two approaches are the intrinsic force standard, which makes the force 
inherent in the act sufficient, and the extrinsic force standard, which makes proof of 
2 Elias has failed to include State's Exhibit 2 in the appellate record. It is well settled 
that missing portions of the record must be presumed to support the action of the trial 
court. State v. Mowery, 128 Idaho 804, 805, 919 P.2d 333, 334 (1996); State v. 
Longoria, 133 Idaho 819, 823, 992 P.2d 1219, 1223 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing Kugler v. 
Drown, 119 Idaho 687,690,809 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Ct. App. 1991). This Court should 
therefore presume at the least that the prosecutor accurately described the 911 call 
during his closing statement. 
3 State v. Jones is currently under review by the Idaho Supreme Court. 
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force above and beyond that inherent in the act necessary. l.sl at 12. Ultimately, the 
Court determined that the extrinsic force standard would apply to the forcible rape 
statute because that statute requires the assailant to "overcome the victim's resistance." 
l.sl at 17. This interpretation is supported by the forcible rape statute since, in the 
absence of the victim's resistance, there is no crime under that statute. kl at 20; see 
also I.C. § 18-6101(4). 
Unlike forcible rape, however, there is no resistance requirement in the forcible 
sexual penetration statute. See I.C. § 18-6608. Therefore, there is no requirement that 
the assailant overcome the victim's resistance to be guilty of forcible sexual penetration. 
Because it has no resistance requirement, forcible sexual penetration in this regard is 
much more akin to the general crime of battery, which merely requires any "[w]illful and 
unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another." I.C. § 18-903(a). Thus, 
the only "force" necessary to commit forcible sexual penetration is the same "force" 
necessary to commit simple battery. Additionally, because it is phrased in the 
disjunctive, "force" is distinct from and need not rise to the level of "violence." 
Applying the logic from Jones, because the victim does not have to resist and the 
assailant does not have to overcome resistance to be guilty of forcible sexual 
penetration, it is not necessary to meet the extrinsic force standard to show forcible 
sexual penetration. Rather, recognizing the parallels between the forcible sexual 
penetration and battery statutes, the intrinsic force standard should be applied to sexual 
penetration as it is in simple battery. Thus, where the actual penetration is willful and 
accomplished without the victim's consent (in this case where S.L.S. was in fact 
unaware of the act), the force inherent in the act itself is sufficient for a jury to conclude 
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that the penetration was accomplished "by use of force." As noted above, Elias 
concedes that the evidence showed that he penetrated S.L.S.'s vagina with his finger. 
(Appellant's brief, p.1.) The circumstances surrounding that penetration (see Tr., p.4D, 
L.1 - p.41, L.22; p.45, L.24 - p.46, L.2) demonstrate that the penetration was willful and 
accomplished without S.L.S.'s consent or knowledge; therefore, it was accomplished by 
use of force. 
Even if this Court were to conclude that evidence of extrinsic force was 
necessary to establish that Elias penetrated S.L.S.'s vagina by use of force, the state 
presented sufficient evidence of extrinsic force to sustain the conviction. First, as noted 
above, Elias was not an invited guest into S.L.S.'s home; he was a trespasser who 
forced entry into her home. (Tr., p.39, Ls.7-9; p.4D, Ls.1-19; p.51, L.2D - p.52, L.1D; 
p.74, Ls.2-1D; p.163, Ls.1-7.) Second, S.L.S. testified that the penetration was painful, 
describing it as feeling "like a razor cut kind of burning feeling ... [insider her] vagina." 
(Tr., p.41, Ls.14-22.) Third, a medical examination, which occurred later the same day 
as the assault, revealed that S.L.S. had abrasions inside her vagina. (Tr., p.101, Ls.18-
23.) This medical evidence would allow the jury to reasonably infer that Elias used 
more force than the incidental force necessary to merely accomplish digital penetration, 
as he had caused an injury. Finally, as noted above, the expert witness explained that, 
based on the location of those abrasions, S.L.S. would have had her legs closed when 
Elias penetrated her (Tr., p.104, Ls.2-23), thus requiring Elias to exert some quantum of 
force above the incidental force required to normally accomplish penetration. From this 
evidence, the jury could properly conclude that Elias accomplished his penetration by 
the use of some extrinsic force. 
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Elias's only mention of his use of force is the general claim, without explanation, 
that "[n]o evidence was presented that Mr. Elias used force .... " (Appellant's brief, 
p.11.) He focuses instead on whether S.L.S. was "incapable, through any unsoundness 
of mind, whether temporary or permanent, of giving legal consent" because she was 
asleep. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-11.) Elias argues that, when read in pari materia, "any 
unsoundness of mind" must refer to a mental defect and is not shown by the victim's 
merely being asleep. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-10.) The Court need not reach that issue 
in this case, however, because the evidence that Elias penetrated S.L.S.'s vagina 
against her will by use of force is overwhelming. Elias's conviction should be upheld 
because the state presented sufficient evidence for the jury to find that he penetrated 
S.L.S.'s vagina against her will by use of force. 
Elias's conduct is prohibited by Idaho Code § 18-6608, which criminalizes "the 
penetration, however slight, of the genital ... of another person, ... against the victim's 
will by use of force .... " The state presented sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Elias digitally penetrated S.L.S.'s vagina against her 
will by use of force. Elias's conviction for forcible sexual penetration should therefore be 
affirmed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Elias's conviction and 
sentence. 
DATED this 6th day of August, 2012. 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 6th day of August, 2012, served a true and 
correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy addressed 
to: 
JASON C. PINTLER 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
S~R 
Deputy Attorney General 
RJS/pm 
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